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Abstract 
Transitioning towards a low emission society is a goal of numerous international and national political and 
administrative levels. This includes reducing impacts of road transport. While aiming for a transition towards 
more sustainable mobility, it is particularly striking that road capacity expansion is presently under planning 
or implementation in most main cities in Norway. Against this backdrop, we decided to study Trondheim’s 
Environmental Transport Package because this has a strong environmental profile with main objectives of 
reducing CO2 emissions and limiting car traffic, while at the same time increasing road capacity. Our 
exploration of how political decision-makers reflect on including road capacity expansion in a plan aimed at 
reducing traffic volume is only a first step towards finding out how an apparent disconnect between stated 
objectives and policy measures is reconciled. This might provide opportunities for better understanding and 
influencing politicians’ framing and actions early on, before measures are included that counteract the 
transition towards more sustainable mobility. We believe our explorative study reveals how motivated 
political decision-makers reason when faced with conflicting goals and contradictions, and, may contribute to 
a better understanding of what hinders transition in similar processes in other cities in Norway and abroad.  
 




Mobility has been seen, historically, as the possibility to move, unhindered, from A to B 
(to C) by the easiest and fastest route possible, thus supporting the freedom of the 
individual and a ‘better life’ (Freudendal-Pedersen, Hannam, and Kesselring 2016). Within 
this traditional paradigm, transport planning is often of the type known as ‘predict and 
provide’. Traffic growth has been defined almost solely through growth in population, 
business and economy, and as something inevitable. The approach to avoiding congestion 




growth and provide the road capacity necessary. Given this understanding, if new roads 
were built as ring roads, and/or in tunnels, it was thought that the local environment would 
improve, as traffic would be drained from local streets and city centres – local pollution, 
noise, traffic accidents, and so on, would all be reduced. This development, resulting in 
cities spreading without any increase in travel time (Banister 2008) and allowing growth in 
urban road traffic volumes (Tennøy 2010), might partly explain why the transport sector as 
a whole is responsible for about 25 percent of global CO2 emissions. And even though 
increased vehicle and engine efficiency and low-carbon fuels are important contributors to 
a low emissions society, GHG emissions continue to grow (Sims et al. 2014). In a 
Norwegian context, it is striking that although plans at all political levels clearly state 
objectives of reduced CO2 emissions and zero growth in urban road traffic volumes, road 
capacity expansions are under planning or implementation in most main cities. 
With an increased focus on the effects of climate change and on the unsuccessful 
experiences of road-building as one way out of congestion, the concept of sustainable 
mobility has emerged, emphasising transition towards a low emission society. The early 
1990s saw ‘a reframing of the transport problem’ (Owens and Cowell 2002), with a new 
approach to traffic problems and congestion in cities. This included steering land-use and 
transport system developments in directions that reduced transport demand, car 
dependency and traffic volumes. This paradigm problematized urban road capacity 
expansion, as this was understood as facilitating car-use and as having traffic-inducing 
effects (more on this later). This has since been termed ‘predict and prevent’ (Owens 
1995) or the ‘sustainable mobility paradigm’ (Banister 2008). One could argue that the 
emergence of the sustainable mobility paradigm was to question the ethics behind the 
frictionless society posted by the traditional paradigm and its differential mobility (Sheller 
and Urry 2016). Aiming at transition towards a low emission society, environmental 
impacts associated with physical transport had to be reduced. Such goals are stated by 
numerous International and National political and administrative levels (European 
Commission 2011, Ministry of Climate and Environment 2007, 2012, Ministry of 
Transport and Communications 2013, Banister 2011, Owens and Cowell 2002). Banister 
(2008, 74) argued that “the intention is not to prohibit the use of the car [but rather] to 
design cities of such quality and on a suitable scale that people would not need to have a 
car”. Factors such as public policy, planning and urbanisation have thus emerged as 
increasingly important (Sheller and Urry 2016). 
In previous studies, professionals have not always reframed their ways of thinking and 
acting towards understanding the new paradigm (Næss et al. 2013, Tennøy 2010). In some 
studies, it has been pointed out that part of the problem rather lies at the political level 
(Flyvbjerg 1998, Tennøy et al. 2016). Political decision-makers may define objectives 
concerning reduction in CO2 emissions and growth in urban road traffic volumes, but 
might not know how certain transport system developments affect traffic volumes, or they 
might not be willing to develop transport systems in ways contributing to the achievement 




they make decisions on developing transport systems in ways that, according to research-
based knowledge, clearly reduce the likelihood they will achieve the objectives they have 
defined. We explore this through a case study in which we interview six politicians in the 
city of Trondheim about their reflections on including urban road capacity expansions in a 
policy-package designed to stop traffic growth and reduce CO2 emissions from traffic.  
 
2. The Trondheim case 
2.1 An interesting inconsistency 
In 2008, political decision-makers in Trondheim adopted a policy package with the 
ambitious objectives of “reducing CO2 emissions, limiting car traffic and improving 
conditions for walking, cycling and public transport” (MoT 2008c, 1; authors’ translation). 
Examples of the 10 concrete objectives were: reducing CO2 emissions from transport by at 
least 20 percent by 2018 (compared to emissions in 2008); reducing private car travel from 
58 percent of all trips in 2008 to 50 percent in 2018; and increasing the share of 
ecofriendly modes of transport (walking, bicycling and public transport) from 42 to 50 
percent. Other objectives mainly concerned implementation of contributory measures: 
reducing traffic accidents and improving the local environment – objectives to a large 
degree reflected in the measures included in the package. An important aspect was 
reintroduction of a road toll scheme, which was the main source of finance for the package, 
together with additional funding from Government. Other measures were: to substantially 
improve public transport services and bicycle infrastructure; to steer land-use 
developments towards densification and transformation rather than sprawl; and to reduce 
parking access and increase parking fees.  
A striking inconsistency was that half the funding in the package was set aside to expand 
road capacity on existing roads and to build new roads. This seemed unnecessary if traffic 
volumes were to be curbed and reduced, as it required major investment which could be 
used instead for improving mobility by other modes of transport. Furthermore, the traffic-
inducing effects of expanding road capacity in congested urban transport systems have 
been well researched and documented (Downs 1962, Mogridge 1997, Noland and Lem 
2002). It would mean that the chances of the main objectives defined in the policy package 
being achieved would be reduced. We considered this to be an interesting case for 
exploring how political decision-makers reflect on including measures that, according to 
well documented knowledge, reduce the chances for achieving objectives they have 
defined.  
2.2 Some background on the ‘Trondheim package’ 
Trondheim is the largest city in mid-Norway and the third largest in the country (165,000 
inhabitants in 2008), with a rising population and steady growth in traffic (Jean-Hansen, 
Hanssen, and Aas 2009). Based on governmental signals in the proposition of the new 




would not be granted funding for transport infrastructure (MoT 2008a). Furthermore, with 
income from the road tolling system removed in late 2005, finances for developing 
transport systems in ways meeting future challenges were diminished.  
In parallel, as “International commitments […] filtered down to the city level” (Tønnesen 
2015a, 90), the Government was sending out strong signals to municipalities on the need to 
curb CO2 emissions from road traffic through the Parliament’s climate agreement 
(Ministry of Climate and Environment 2007). Furthermore, the Government increased its 
focus on policy packages, with the notion that a deliberate combination of policy measures 
might better enhance effectiveness than more isolated planning, and thus increase goal 
achievement potential (Tønnesen 2015a). With the addition of a new reward programme, 
the larger municipalities were even more strongly incentivised to organise efforts between 
policy actors at different sectors and levels to reduce private car-use and increase public 
transport use through policy packages (Tønnesen 2015b). Policy packages are normally 
cooperation between municipal planning authorities and transport authorities, national and 
regional transport authorities and other relevant agencies, all of which steer 
implementation of packages through a secretariat. The policy package structure is thus 
more a coordinator and developer of mutual agreements (Tønnesen 2015a) than a statutory 
package with strong judicial implications.  
Inspired by these challenges and signals, work with the policy package was initiated, and 
on 31 January 2008 the City Council gave the Climate Committee the mandate to produce 
a policy package safeguarding both local and national interests and plans (MoT 2008a). 
Less than three months later, on 24 April 2008, Trondheim’s City Council adopted ‘the 
Municipality of Trondheim’s Environmental Transport Package’ (MoT 2008c), hereafter 
‘the Trondheim package’. The Labour Party held almost 44 percent of the vote and the 
Mayoral seat, and initiated the work with the Trondheim package. At the time, Labour was 
the largest party at both regional level and in the state Government. The local Labour party 
thus recognised a window of opportunity to have the package adopted and approved 
quickly at all three levels, and thus safeguard room for manoeuvre financially. In total, the 
six parties supporting the Trondheim package held 65 percent of the vote. The package 
was a local political initiative, but turned into an agreement between the Municipality of 
Trondheim, Sør-Trøndelag County and the Norwegian Public Roads Administration. In 
addition, the local and regional public transport provider (AtB) and the Norwegian Public 
Rails Administration participated in meetings regarding public transport and the 
Norwegian Cyclists’ Association in meetings about cycling. 
2.3 Interaction between politicians and planners  
Exploration of how political decision-makers reflect on and frame problems and solutions 
in this article is part of a large project investigating integrated planning, political processes 
and institutional changes affecting innovation in public transport in Nordic regions. 




involved in integrated land-use and transport planning think and act stimulated our 
curiosity into how political decision-makers reflect and reason.  
When analysing the stories of planners in three case cities through the lens of Butler’s 
(1990, 2010) work on performativity, Lisandrello et al. (2016) described a practice in 
which professional planners work closely with political decision-makers when successfully 
developing and implementing plans and projects. On the Trondheim package, the lead 
planner described how the policy package was a truly political initiative, inspired by 
previous analyses and plans developed by the professionals. Leading municipal politicians 
invited him for an informal talk, presented him with a document of intentions, and asked 
him to develop their ideas into a feasible planning document. The planner saw this as a 
window of opportunity, since similar ideas had long been under discussion in the 
professional milieu. They needed to act quickly to complete the package agreement before 
the next election. The planners explained how active listening and communication with the 
politicians was crucial if an agreement was to be reached and with respect to objectives 
and measures. An important repetitive act was reiterating the main objectives to politicians 
and to the media as a way of legitimating measures to be adopted and of rendering visible 
their effects on the city and its citizens.   
Næss et al. (2013) analysed whether there was consistency or a gap between research-
based ‘state-of-the-art’ knowledge and knowledge claims found in key planning documents 
in the three Nordic case cities. They found discrepancies in regard to the effects of road 
capacity expansion on traffic volumes. The traffic-inducing effects of expanding road 
capacity in congested urban transport systems are well documented, and are explained as 
results of combined mechanisms working on different time scales. One is that increased 
road capacity in congested traffic systems normally increases travel speed by car, at least 
in the short run. In turn, this increases the competitiveness of the private car in regard to 
other modes and may cause rapid shifts to car-use. It also reduces the resistance to travel, 
and contributes to shifts towards more and longer trips (Downs 1962, Goodwin 1996, 
Mogridge 1997, Noland and Lem 2002, Twitchett 2013). Indirect mechanisms working in 
a longer time perspective have even stronger effects. Increasing travel speed by car allows 
longer journeys within a given time – people and businesses locating in ways that result in 
longer commuting and travel distances. Construction of housing, workplaces, retail and 
other activities in more peripheral, car-based and traffic-generating areas is thus more 
attractive (Killer and Axhausen 2009, Litman 2015, Noland and Lem 2002, Næss 2012). 
Under the right circumstances, these mechanisms will contribute to increased car-
dependency and traffic volumes up until traffic growth causes congestions anew, but now 
with more participants (Downs 1962). Despite these mechanisms being well documented, 
it was found that planning documents often downplayed or ignored the traffic-inducing 
effects of increased urban road capacity.  
When investigating how planners’ use and non-use of expert knowledge in planning affect 




knowledge is used does indeed affect the goal achievement potential of plans. Relevant 
expert knowledge is paramount for the knowing and acting of many planners. It affects 
their framing of problems as well as which measures they consider and suggest. Non-use 
of relevant expert knowledge was an important part of the explanation as to how and why 
measures reducing goal achievement potential, such as road capacity expansions, were 
included in the plans. When competing objectives, understandings or ideas seemingly 
called for traffic-increasing measures, the planners did not use the relevant expert 
knowledge to explain that this would reduce the goal achievement potential of plans. One 
explanation was that planners exercised self-censorship and chose not to bring the 
knowledge into planning processes since they did not believe they could persuade the 
political decision-makers to act accordingly. In Trondheim, planners understood very well 
that increasing road capacity was counter-productive with respect to achievement of the 
main objectives. They made politicians aware of this, but found it pointless to explain 
further or to argue about it since their understanding was that political decision-makers 
were convinced that inclusion of the road capacity expansions was necessary. Tennøy et al. 
(2016, 15) concluded that the “expert knowledge in question was ousted when planners 
understood that the implications were not acceptable in – or threatening to – the local 
political context”. This illustrated that power relations between planners and political 
decision-makers may be important explanations when planners include traffic-increasing 
measures in plans. They illuminate the importance of political decision-makers 
understanding the effects and consequences of including or excluding certain measures in 
plans and policy packages, and also their willingness to use or refrain from using certain 
measures if the transition towards a low emission society was to succeed. 
2.4 Aim and research question 
In this study, we turned our attention to political decision-makers. We explored how they 
reflect when including measures that, according to well-documented knowledge, reduce 
the chances of their plans’ main objective being achieved; in this case, to include urban 
road capacity expansion in a policy package aimed at stopping traffic growth and reducing 
CO2 emissions from traffic. The aim of the paper is to improve our understanding of the 
reflections and trade-offs of local politicians in such situations. We asked: How do political 
decision-makers reflect on including road capacity expansion in a plan aimed at reducing 
traffic volumes? 
3. Theoretical framework 
When exploring how political decision-makers reflect when including measures reducing 
the goal achievement potentials of their plans and how they reconcile this apparent 
disconnect, we used Rein and Schön’s concept of framing as our main theoretical 
approach. Rein and Schön (1993, 146) described framing as “a way of selecting, 
organizing, interpreting and making sense of a complex reality to provide guideposts for 
knowing, analysing, persuading, and acting”. The way an individual frames a problem is 




values); by the context in which the problem is understood (scale, perceptions, discourses); 
and by their knowledge (scholarly knowledge, lay knowledge, personal experiences, 
understanding). Goals, context and knowledge cannot be seen independently. They are 
tightly interwoven, they affect each other, and they influence how an individual frames a 
problem, which in turn influences how a certain situation is assessed and what are 
understood as relevant and acceptable actions to solve the problem (see figure 1).  
 
Figure 1 here.  
How context, objectives and knowledge influence each other; how, combined, they lead to 
a framing of the situation; and hence how the situation is assessed and the actions taken.  
The objectives in the Trondheim package concerning reduced traffic volumes and CO2 
emissions were clearly defined and therefore the politicians might have been expected to 
stay focused and give them high priority. On the other hand, there will always be an array 
of objectives in planning processes – some in conflict with the main one. If any conflicting 
objectives are given higher priority than the main objective in the package, and road 
capacity expansion is understood as important measure to achieve these conflicting 
objectives, this could be one potential explanation why political decision-makers find it 
reasonable that road capacity expansion is included in a plan aimed at reducing traffic 
volumes and CO2 emissions from transport. 
The context in which politicians understand a situation/problem affects their framing of it. 
According to Lowe (2011), framing must be seen in relation to scale. Whether the scale is 
neighbourhood, city or region can have a great impact on how we frame a situation and 
problem, and what measures are seen as appropriate and thus implemented. Scale is thus an 
important contextual factor. In the Trondheim package (MoT 2008c), noise and traffic 
accidents have to be reduced at local level. At regional level, the package is supposed to 
contribute to reduction of land-take and urban sprawl. At global level, CO2 emissions from 
traffic have to be reduced if global warming is to be reduced. To understand the action 
politicians took in the Trondheim package, we therefore needed to understand the context 
in which the political decision-makers see the problems. If they see problems in a context 
where expanding road capacity could be perceived as a solution, this might be seen as 
positive even if it contributes negatively to reducing traffic volumes and CO2 emissions 
from traffic. Context also concerns time-scales. Measures contributing to solving problems 
in the long term may seem inadequate in the short term, while measures solving problems 
in the short term can be inadequate or contribute negatively long term. Another potential 
explanation behind politicians finding it reasonable to include counteracting measures, 
might be that they have shifted their focus from a global and long-term context to a more 
local and short-term context. 
Lastly, the individuals’ knowledge about an issue influences the causal interrelations they 




about the interrelations between land-use development, transport systems development and 
traffic volumes, and it can therefore be expected that politicians working with these issues, 
usually in collaboration with trained planners, have gained insights as well, and to varying 
degree. However, those not well schooled in these issues may see lay knowledge, their 
own experiences and intuitive understanding as just as advantageous as empirical and 
theoretical expert knowledge. A last potential explanation as to why local politicians find it 
reasonable to include counteracting measures might be that their understanding and 
knowledge are not aligned with the expert knowledge in the field. 
Normally, politicians will have to see a problem in local, regional and global contexts, and 
in long-term and short-term perspectives. They will have multiple objectives that 
sometimes conflict and they will have to place them in order of priority. They will have 
varying degrees of knowledge concerning a number of relevant issues in specific cases. 
Based on an understanding of what defines an individual’s framing – its effect on how a 
situation is assessed, its problems defined and solutions arrive at – we believe that this is a 
fruitful approach when investigating the objectives politicians in Trondheim consider most 
important; the context they see the problems in, as well as their knowledge of interrelations 
between road capacity expansion and traffic growth.  
4. Research design and methodology 
Our research was designed as an explorative case study of how political decision-makers 
reconcile the apparent disconnect between policy measures and stated objectives in a plan 
they themselves have been part of designing. A case study was therefore a good choice of 
methodology, as the research questions we are posing are problem-driven and aimed at a 
deeper understanding of the issue, rather than methodologically driven and aimed at an 
overview of the breadth of the phenomenon. According to Flyvbjerg (2006), this is what 
constitutes good social science. Case studies are essential in developing social science, and 
thorough case studies are necessary as “[...] a discipline without exemplars is an ineffective 
one” (Flyvbjerg 2006, 242, based on Kuhn 1987). The main data-collecting methods were 
document studies and semi-structured in-depth interviews.  
First, we read the relevant background documents and studied the package agreement in-
depth to gain knowledge and insights into the process and final agreement, i.e. why and 
when the Trondheim package was initiated and adopted. The main documents examined 
were national guidelines and white papers (Ministry of Climate and Environment 2007, 
Ministry of Transport and Communications 2009), as well as documents on the Package 
and the agreement itself (MoT 2008a, 2008b, 2008c).  
When attempting to access the observations of others and learn from people’s own 
experiences, interpretations and perceptions, interviews are particularly suitable method 
(Weiss 1995). To gain insight and understand how the package’s objectives and measures 
emerged, and also why the politicians acted as they did, we interviewed five key 
politicians, appointed by their parties to be closely involved in the design and adoption 




involved in initiation and design. Using transcribed interviews and notes, we first analysed 
each interview in light of the package documents. Our aim was to strengthen our 
knowledge of each politician’s assessment of the final package and its measures, as well as 
their reflections and actions on the process. Then we analysed and compared the interviews 
with the aim of understanding the politicians’ reflections in the theoretical framework.   
The interviews took place in June 2011, three years after the package was adopted. Six 
parties supported it, but because we were not able to interview the key politician from one 
party, only five are part of our data collection. All interviews were conducted one-to-one, 
and lasted approximately one hour. We focused on: (i) their explanations as to why these 
objectives and measures were included, with special attention to road capacity expansion; 
(ii) their explanations about how and why the measures would contribute to goal 
achievement; and (iii) how politicians perceived their own package compared to expert 
knowledge. Together, these three insights helped us understand the politicians’ framing, 
their assessment of the situation and their actions. As part of quality assessment, all 
interviewees were offered the opportunity to control and correct our minutes from the 
interviews. 
5. Findings 
In the interviews, we focused mainly on explanations given by the politicians about why 
road capacity expansion and road-building were seen as appropriate measures, and how 
they explained this in relation to the main objective of the Trondheim package. This is 
explained in our theoretical framework. Lastly, we also studied how they perceived their 
package compared to the expert knowledge in the field and why a ‘theoretical ideal 
package’, in this case one with no road capacity expansion, was not considered. 
5.1 Objectives, context and knowledge 
Politicians readily talk about the objectives in the Trondheim package and explain that the 
measures included are a holistic way of trying to reach the main objective. However, when 
questioned about how the road capacity expansion measures fit, they explain that while a 
capacity increase is not unproblematic given their main objective, it is an important 
measure to relieve congestion. They emphasise that the estimated population growth would 
increase transport demand and road traffic significantly, and that the current congestion 
problem would deteriorate further. All but one politician explained that congestion was a 
problem in itself, as well as in regard to time spent in traffic and to costs for individuals, 
businesses and society. Congestion is perceived as a problem for both public transport and 
essential traffic, e.g. ‘mobile offices’ (tradesmen of different description) and freight, 
because they are held up in the same queues as private cars and ‘inessential traffic’. The 
necessity of road capacity expansion is thus mainly explained based on local, socio-
economic factors. However, politicians also explain that congestion is a problem: as cars 
jammed up in traffic release more CO2 than cars in free flow; as it leads to increased traffic 
through areas where it is not wanted, as traffic spills onto other roads in an attempt to avoid 




Norway cutting through Trondheim is delayed by local congestion. Other explanations for 
the necessity of road capacity expansion, some of which may be linked to congestion 
(relief), is to: reduce bottlenecks in the system; improve traffic flow throughout the system; 
improve accessibility to the city centre; relieve residential areas, school routes and central 
areas of vehicular traffic; improve local environment; and increase accessibility, safety and 
road standard. Only one politician believed that road-building was not the answer to 
congestion, and explained that “what the others want to accomplish with the package is to 
increase road capacity. […] my party is sceptical to the road projects in the package, and 
tries to reduce them”. His party only joined in to reduce ‘the damage done’ by road-
building as much as possible, and to work towards a maximum of environmentally friendly 
measures. All the other politicians explained the necessity of road capacity expansion as an 
answer to their priority objective (as they say themselves) of relieving congestion, an 
objective not stated in the Trondheim package documents. There thus seems to be an 
inherent goal conflict between the main objective of reducing CO2 emissions stated in the 
package and the politicians’ verbally stated objective of relieving congestion. We will 
return to this in our Discussion section.  
When the issues at hand is multi-faceted, it can be difficult to separate between different 
contexts and scales. All the measures in the Trondheim package can be defined as local 
because they are implemented in a local context. However, the problems these measures 
should contribute to solve, could be local, regional, national or global. When talking about 
the Trondheim package during interviews, the politicians shifted between local and global 
scales – one minute on congestion and local environment as benefactors of road capacity 
expansion, the next on how local measures such as densification of work places and 
housing lead to more walking and cycling and thus less CO2 emissions from traffic into the 
global sphere. Only one politician explains that the main problem to be solved was the 
global objective of reducing CO2 emissions. He argues that road capacity should not be 
increased because it leads to induced traffic and increased CO2 emissions. The others 
explained the need for road construction as answers to local problems, e.g. local 
congestion; few if any ring roads keeping traffic and heavy motor vehicles outside the city; 
the challenging city topography (steep hills), which is a safety issue during winter months; 
and a road network that would not cope with future traffic flows.  
Turning to knowledge, we were curious about whether the politicians were aware of the 
causal interrelations between road capacity expansion and increased traffic volumes and 
CO2 emissions. No one refuted this, and most stated openly that they did know about it, 
while some implied it. One stated that “[…] everybody knows that road capacity expansion 
encourages increased car use”, one said: “you can’t build your way out of congestion, you 
have to find other solutions”, and yet another “many might say it is censurable that we call 
it an Environmental Transport Package, when such a large proportion of road 
construction is included”. However, they went on to explain how they would counteract 
the expected rise in traffic volumes with other measures such as cheaper and faster public 




infrastructure for cycling and walking. Furthermore, by converting car lanes into bus lanes, 
establishing road tolls with higher peak charging and making it harder and more expensive 
to park in city centres, the conditions for car-use would be poorer. Together, these 
measures will help restore the competitive balance between different transport modes, and 
counteract the increased competitiveness reduced congestion gives for the private car. The 
knowledge politicians have of expanded road capacity, of mitigating measures towards 
increased car-use and of how changes in one mode’s competitiveness is likely to affect use 
of others, is thus in accordance with current expert knowledge in the field.  
5.2 How politicians perceive expert knowledge and a ‘theoretical ideal package’ 
Given that politicians’ knowledge is in accordance with the current expert knowledge, we 
asked how their package compared with the expert knowledge in the field, and why a 
“theoretical ideal package”, in this case one with no road capacity expansion, was not 
considered. 
When asked about expert knowledge, all politicians boast about the competence and 
knowledge of those involved in the Trondheim package and about the work done, 
including municipal in-house expertise. They tell us about close cooperation and dialogue 
during the design phase, and that they believe the expert would vouch for the measures 
included. They state that their package is mostly in line with expert knowledge. However, 
they also make statements such as “even professional recommendations differ”, “they 
know a lot, but they might benefit from being reviewed by politicians” and “we politicians 
have to use common sense, and during discussions we find reasonable solutions”. As 
discussed earlier, they are well aware of how their package differs from ‘a theoretical ideal 
package’.  
When asked why they didn’t opt for the ‘theoretical ideal package’ with no road capacity 
expansion, they tell us that “as politicians we have to take other considerations into 
account than an expert does”, “politics is ‘the art of the possible’; you have to negotiate 
towards acceptable solutions for all participating parties” and “even though you come up 
with an ideal system to achieve your goals, it may not be ideal in real life. If you fail to get 
the people’s understanding of its necessity, then it may not work as you think it will”. 
Hence, it may be that politicians also consider the response of their voters when in political 
processes, and thus that this affects the design of the package. 
6. Discussion 
Our starting point in this article was to explore how political decision-makers reflect on 
including road capacity expansion in a plan aimed at reducing traffic volumes. We 
analysed the politicians’ reflections and the apparent goal conflict in light of the theoretical 
framework and the three potential explanations as to why political decision-makers find it 
reasonable to include road capacity expansion in a plan aimed at reducing traffic volumes. 




package, and then the politicians’ ways of thinking and acting against the two paradigms 
presented in the Introduction.  
6.1 Politicians’ reflections on including road capacity expansion in a plan aimed at 
reducing traffic volumes 
The apparent goal conflict identified in our findings seems to be that between the main 
objective of reducing CO2 emissions stated in the package documents and the politicians’ 
verbally stated objective of relieving congestion. The first potential explanation – that 
politicians gave priority to objectives other than reducing traffic volumes and CO2 
emissions – thus might be the reason why this goal conflict emerged. When politicians 
focus on congestion relief as an objective, their attention turns to solving a local problem 
rather than the global one of reducing CO2 emissions. Road capacity expansion is seen as a 
measure contributing to solving the local congestion problem, and politicians thus don’t 
see the problem of including a counteracting measure in their plan.  
Drawing on this, the second potential explanation – that they have shifted their focus from 
a global and long-term context to a more local and short-term context – might be 
important in why they are comfortable including road capacity expansion and also for the 
identified goal conflict which seems to have its origin in issues of different scales; reducing 
CO2 emissions is an answer to a global climate problem, while congestion relief is mainly 
a local socio-economic transport problem.  
Lastly, we were curious if and how politicians reconcile this apparent disconnect and its 
inherent goal conflict. We know that they all know the causal interrelations between road 
capacity expansion and induced traffic, and that they are well aware of how the 
competitive balance between modes can be affected (see section 5 above). The third 
potential explanation – that their understanding and knowledge are not aligned with the 
expert knowledge in the field – is thus not correct. However, it is interesting to note that 
even though the politicians possess this knowledge, instead of using it to argue against 
road capacity expansion they use it to justify road capacity expansion as a measure to solve 
local congestion problems. As they also possess the knowledge on how to mitigate the 
induced traffic effects of road capacity expansion, they do not see this apparent disconnect 
as a goal conflict, but instead as a way of ‘solving it all’. 
Based on our findings and the above discussion, the politicians’ framing of road capacity 
expansion in the package can be drawn: 
In Trondheim we have issues related to local congestion problems (context), 
which need to be relieved (objective), and increased road capacity is an 
important measure in solving this problem. We know that this leads to 
induced traffic, but we will counteract the negative effects with various 
positive and restrictive measures aimed at strengthening public transport, 
bicycling and walking (knowledge).  




Increased road capacity will increase traffic volumes and thus CO2 emissions, 
but through mitigating measures we will compensate for this effect. We thus 
believe it is acceptable to include road capacity expansion.  
This leads to action, which in this case is to support and participate in the Trondheim 
package and thus support road capacity expansion. However, some politicians also state 
that “These roads would have been built either way, but this way at least we were able to 
get some measures targeting environmentally friendly transport out of it”. 
Only one politician supporting the Trondheim package does not support road capacity 
expansion. He focuses on the global context with a long-term objective of reducing car 
traffic and CO2 emissions. He explains that his party only took part in the package to 
mitigate the negative effects of road capacity expansion. For him, we can draw a framing 
sounding something like this:  
In Trondheim we have issues related to increasing traffic volumes and CO2 
emissions (context). Road capacity should thus not be increased. The 
Environmental Transport Package has granted half its funding for road 
building, and the only way we would be able to argue this self-contradiction 
was through participation (objective). Even though we have signed for the 
road capacity expansion, we will do what we can to reduce the road capacity 
expansion measures, and to strengthen the various positive and restrictive 
measures aimed at strengthening public transport, bicycling and walking 
(knowledge).  
He thus assesses the situation a little differently from the other politicians: 
Increased road capacity will increase traffic volumes and thus CO2 emissions, 
but the Trondheim package enables other positive measures that otherwise 
would likely not be implemented. 
The outcome is that this politician takes the same action as the others, but based on a 
slightly different framing and assessment of the situation.  
Since the same reasoning, explanations and objectives recur, a question arising from the 
similar framing among politicians supporting the package is whether a shift of frames has 
occurred. Politicians are actors in constant change, and they continuously respond to and 
learn from the situations they find themselves in. According to Rein and Schön (1993), a 
shift of frames may occur when one attains new knowledge, new experiences or new 
objectives. As a political compromise between six parties, it is not unlikely that the process 
started with politicians having (partly) conflicting frames. Consensus on why increased 
road capacity is necessary, as well as on how the stated objective of reducing CO2 
emissions can be achieved, may indicate that shared frames have been reached during the 
political negotiation process over time and through discussions and dialogue. This might 
be a result of gradual and subconsciously changing frames (Rein and Schön 1993). It may 




compromise within a negotiation process, you’ll be responsible for the entire package. […] 
Then, you really can’t criticize the compromise you were a part of designing”. 
6.2 How political considerations might affect the Trondheim package 
As discussed under Findings, all politicians boast about the competence and knowledge of 
the experts involved in the package, including municipal in-house expertise. However, 
when asked why they didn’t opt for a package with no road capacity expansion, they tell us 
that they “have to use common sense, and […] find reasonable solutions”. As politicians, 
they probably need to consider how their actions reflect on both themselves and their 
political party, and how it might resonate with their voters. As we did not ask them directly 
if and how considerations towards their voters affected their actions, these are questions we 
don’t know the answers to. However, reading between the lines there are indications that 
some political considerations are made: “We must explain to our voters why we believe this 
is the way to move forward”. Furthermore, even though politicians’ knowledge aligns with 
the expert knowledge in the field, it might be that their voters’ knowledge is not. If 
politicians believe their voters will not support their ‘ideal proposal’, whether based on 
knowledge or not, it might be that they pocket some of their principles to please their 
voters; this in an effort to ensure re-election and the possibility of political influence also 
after the next local election. This is much in line with Tønnesen’s (2015a, 90) statement 
that “political and public acceptance is highly important in the implementation of transport 
policy packages”. While the desire for re-election probably influenced politicians in 
Trondheim, in this case it seems to have been based more on a desire to continue the 
developmental path the city was following, rather than to please their voters. Based on the 
interviews, there seems to have been an understanding that ‘we know better’. One 
politician explained: “When we first introduced the idea of changing the existing car lanes 
into public transport lanes, the people were furious. But now surveys show that most 
believe this was a good idea”.  
6.3 Ongoing shift of paradigms 
A still ongoing shift of paradigms often confuses discussions on interrelations between 
road capacity and traffic volumes (Banister 2008, Owens 1995, Owens and Cowell 2002). 
It is thus interesting to discuss the politicians’ reflections and actions in light of the two 
paradigms presented in our Introduction. We find that they use both old solutions (road 
capacity expansion from the ‘predict and provide’ paradigm) and new solutions (on how to 
curb traffic growth from the ‘predict and prevent’ paradigm) to achieve their overall 
objective, which is “to reduce CO2 emissions, limit car traffic and improve conditions for 
walking, cycling and public transport” (MoT 2008c, 1). The problem is that these 
theoretical paradigms are incompatible because while one facilitates increased traffic the 
other try to hinder it. The politicians try to provide for and prevent car traffic at one and the 
same time, and thus have a foot in each paradigm. This is in line with what Banister (2008, 
74) discusses as “the contradiction between the desire to speed up and the desire to slow 




problem because development continues down the same path as before. It cannot be 
concluded that politicians’ reflections are completely in line with either of the paradigms 
presented in the Introduction. However, as they have started to include various positive and 
restrictive measures to curb car traffic and shift modal splits towards more sustainable 
mode shares, there are indications that in Trondheim there is an ongoing shift towards a 
sustainable mobility paradigm.  
 
8. Concluding Remarks 
Transitioning towards a low emission society is a goal stated at numerous international and 
national political and administrative levels. A necessary part of this transition is in 
reducing environmental impacts from transport, through technological developments and 
shifts towards low-/no-carbon fuels, and through land-use and transport development in 
ways that reduce car-dependency and traffic volumes. The latter, which has proved 
difficult in many cities and countries, was the starting point for our explorative study. 
In the case of Trondheim, knowing that planners made politicians aware of the effects of 
road capacity expansion on traffic volumes (Tennøy et al. 2016) made it particularly 
interesting to explore how political decision-makers made use of this knowledge. Against 
this backdrop, we chose to study Trondheim’s Environmental Transport Package, which 
was the first in Norway to include a strong environmental profile and a main objective of 
reducing CO2 emissions and limiting car traffic. However, at the same time it included 
measures that increased road capacity, which, according to research-based knowledge, 
clearly reduced the chances of the defined objectives being achieved. It was thus a unique 
opportunity for us to analyse how development negatively affecting future sustainability 
mobility is rationalised. 
In 2012, the Norwegian Government adopted a zero-growth objective, which meant that 
increasing transport demand caused by population growth in the largest Norwegian cities 
should not to bring about growth in road traffic volumes (Ministry of Climate and 
Environment, 2012). While aiming for a transition towards more sustainable mobility, it is 
particularly striking that road capacity expansion is under planning or implementation in 
most main cities in Norway. This illustrates that our specific case is relevant beyond the 
context of the Trondheim case. Since increased urban road capacity induces and allows 
increased road traffic, these actions counteract strategies aimed at reducing car-dependency 
and traffic volumes in cities. Our exploration of how political decision-makers reflect on 
their own actions, and on if and how they reconcile an apparent disconnect between stated 
objectives and the policy measures, is a step towards better understanding how political 
decision-makers reason with these kinds of contradiction. Our findings indicate that the 
politicians did indeed make use of the expert knowledge provided, but that they found their 
own way of using it, i.e. not arguing against road capacity expansion, but justifying it. As 
political decision-makers are ultimately those who decide what measures will and will not 




knowledge on how planning policy could be developed in ways providing better 
opportunities for shaping future sustainable mobility.  
We believe that our explorative study on how particularly motivated political decision-
makers reason when facing goal conflicts and contradictions, may contribute to a better 
understanding of what hinders transition towards more sustainable mobility. The insights 
presented are probably not exclusive to Norway, and might contribute to similar 
discussions in other sectors and levels concerning what hinders necessary transitions. 
Deeper knowledge and better understandings might provide opportunities to influence 
politicians’ framing and actions early on, before they include measures counteracting 
stated goals. This can potentially have large effects on future planning practices and 
policies, and spur transition towards a sustainable future and a low emission society.  
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